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Abstract
When universal quantum computer is used by public, it is assumed
that it will be used as a quantum cloud server that exists in a few bases
because the quantum computer is expensive. When it will be realized,
a quantum universal computer is thought to work as a quantum cloud
server. In the cloud server the privacy is a crucial issue. That is, we
need a blind quantum computation (BQC) protocol so that each user can
use the server without showing the details of the calculation. It is also
important to be able to verify that the server is performing calculations as
instructed by the user, since quantum calculations cannot be verified by
classical computation. In this paper, we give a protocol for the blindness
by using a quantum one-time pad encryption and T-like gate, and for
verifying computation by using trap qubits.
1 Introduction
When universal quantum computer is used by public, it is assumed that it
will be used as a quantum cloud server that exists in a few bases because the
quantum computer is expensive. When it will be realized, a quantum universal
computer is thought to work as a quantum cloud server. In the cloud server
the privacy is a crucial issue. That is, we need a blind quantum computation
(BQC) protocol so that each user can use the server without showing the details
of the calculation. [1–9].
Previous research [2] proposed a method using a quantum one-time pad. The
quantum one-time pad uses the encryption key only once like a classical one-time
pad [10], and the server cannot learn anything about the user’s quantum state.
This protocol needs multiple two-way quantum communications. In addition,
the user is required to have a quantum memory on which a SWAP gate is
executed. In [6], another protocol which requires neither quantum memory nor
SWAP gates and quantum bidirectional communication during a computation
was proposed. In these protocols, however, while the input and output are
encrypted, the calculation process must be revealed to the server. This can is
a crucial drawback because an algorithm itself can be important information
1
|Aθ〉 • A(−1)aθ |ψ〉
|ψ〉 ✌✌✌ a ∈ 0, 1
Figure 1: Executing Aθ gate by gate teleportation.
which is hoped to be secret. In addition, when a malicious server might have
performed a calculation different from the user’s instruction, a user must have
an ability to verify the calculation [4, 5, 7, 11]. However, quantum computers
generally cannot be simulated in polynomial time by classical computers, a
user with limited ability assumed in the previous researches cannot calculate
whether the results obtained from the server are correct. A user with limited
ability assumed in the previous researches cannot verify calculations using trap
qubits, which are closely related to the secrecy of the calculation process.
In this paper, we propose a novel quantum blind computation protocol using
rotation gates in addition to the quantum one-time pad. Our protocol enables
verification using trap qubits and can be extended to fault-tolerant computation.
In this protocol, the requirements for the user are equivalent to the abilities
required for the user in the previous BQC protocol [4].
2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe a gate teleportation and an encryption that is known
quantum one-time pad for the protocol. See [12] for the notation in general
quantum computation.
2.1 Gate teleportation
We explain gate teleportation for a T gate that is used for universal gate sets
and a Aθ gate that is used for blindness in the protocol, where the T gate is
T =
(
1 0
0 e
ipi
4
)
,
and the Aθ gate is
Aθ =
(
1 0
0 eiθ
)
.
Especially, when θ = pi4 , Aθ is equivalent for the T gate.
For a given state |ψ〉, Aθ |ψ〉 is obtained by using gate teleportation as shown
in Figure 1, without directly executing the Aθ gate, where a is measurement
result and, |Aθ〉 is
|Aθ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉).
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2.2 Quantum One-time Pad
In quantum one-time pad, a user(Alice) generates 2 bits encryption key a,b ∈
{0,1} by coin flips, and execute a Xa gate and a Zb gate for encrypting her
input. The state after encryption |ψ〉enc is
|ψ〉enc = XaZb |ψ〉 ,
where |ψ〉 is input, the X gate and the Z gate is pauli matrix
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
The density matrix obtained by the server(Bob) receiving this quantum state
is maximally mixed state as below
1
4
1∑
a,b=0
XaZb |ψ〉 〈ψ|ZbXa = I
2
.
Therefore, Bob who does not know encryption key generated by coin flips cannot
learn the input from the received qubits.
Alice, who has received the quantum state after performing the calculation
U , can decrypt that state using the encryption keys a′ and b′ changed by the
calculation as
Zb
′
Xa
′
U |ψ〉enc = Zb
′
Xa
′
(Xa
′
Zb
′
U |ψ〉) = U |ψ〉 .
As U it suffices to consider only H, T and CNOT which form a universal gate set.
The correspondence between pairs (a, b) and (a′, b′) for each gate is described
in Figures 2-6.
Note that when T gate is executed as shown in Figure 6, we obtain the
following P gate to be modified in addition to X and Z gates. Here, the P gate
is
P = T 2 =
(
1 0
0 i
)
.
The universal gate set requires a non-clifford gate like the T and Toffoli gates
[13]. When executing those non-clifford gates, Alice require modifications other
than the X gate and the Z gate [2, 8].
XaZb |ψ〉 X XaZbX |ψ〉
Figure 2: Key change at the X gate.
XaZb |ψ〉 Z XaZbZ |ψ〉
Figure 3: Key change at the Z gate.
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XaZb |ψ〉 H XbZaH |ψ〉
Figure 4: Key change at the H gate.
XaZb |ψ〉1 • XaZb⊕dCNOTcontrol |ψ〉1
XcZd |ψ〉2 Xa⊕cZdCNOTtarget |ψ〉2
Figure 5: Key change at the CNOT gate.
XaZb |ψ〉 T XaZa⊕bP aT |ψ〉
Figure 6: Key change at the T gate.
3 The Aθ gate and universal quantum computa-
tion
In this section, we explain the Aθ gate that is important for our BQC protocol.
First, we extend the quantum one-time pad by adding the Aθ gate. Next, we
show how to modify the T gate and the Aθ gate in quantum one-time pad. Last,
we explain universal quantum computation by the Aθ gate.
3.1 Quantum one-time pad for the Aθ gate
In this subsection we show that the Aθ gate can be hidden by using quantum
one-time pad. |Aθ〉 encrypted using Quantum one-time pad is given by
|Aθ〉enc = XaZb |Aθ〉 .
When executing gate teleportation by |Aθ〉enc, the Aθ gate works as shown in
Figure 7, since the Z gate commutes with the Aθ gate. Thus, it is possible to
encrypt the Aθ gate by quantum one-time pad. Note that the Aθ state is the
maximum mixed state without encryption using the X gate, so encryption using
the X gate is not required. But the X gate is to hide that the measurement
result. It is using for the modification described following subsection.
3.2 Modifying the Aθ gate
Apllying the T gate and the Aθ gate to a quantum state encrypted by the X
gate, the quantum state is required modification. When the Aθ gate is applyed
to the quantum state encrypted by the X gate, actually a A−θ gate is applyed
to the quantum state instead of the Aθ gate as shown in Figure 8. When Alice
get the undesired measurement results, the Aθ gate is executed since angle is
4
XaZb |Aθ〉 • ZbA(−1)a⊕cθ |ψ〉enc
|ψ〉enc ✌✌✌ c
Figure 7: Key change at the Aθ gate by using gate teleportation
XZb |ψ〉 Aθ XZ1⊕bA−θ |ψ〉
Figure 8: When apllying the Aθ gate to a quantum state encrpted by quantum
one-time pad.
flipped. Thus, even if it is encrypted with the X gate, flipping the desired
measurement result Alice can execute the Aθ gate without changing Aθ state.
The T gate is a special case of the Aθ gate and can be modified in a similar way.
As mentioned above, the Aθ gate needs additional correction because the
angle θ actually executed varies depending on the measurement result. Here,
the angle is limited to θ = npi4 (n = {0, 1, . . . , 7}). If the measurement gives an
undesired result, the state is executed a A−θ gate, so next Alice need to execute
a A2θ gate to correct it. The gate for that correction may also get an undesired
measurement results. The next gate for the second modification is the A4θ gate,
and this θ is limited to θ = npi4 (n = {0, 1, . . . , 7}), thus A4θ = Z or I, so the
correction is completed with executing the Z gate or the I gate. Therefore, if θ
is limited to θ = npi4 (n = {0, 1, . . . , 7}), Alice can execute the Aθ gate certainly
by preparing additional 2 qubit and 1 gate.
3.3 T-like gate group and 1-qubit Universal gate
[12] approximate any 1-qubit gate by the T gate and the H gate, because the
T gate and the H gate can make non-parallel two-axis rotation on the Bloch
sphere. We show the blindness of gates by using non-parallel 8-axis rotation
using the T-like gate. The T-like gate is defined as following:
T = A ipi
4
=
(
1 0
0 e
ipi
4
)
, T 3 = A i3pi
4
=
(
1 0
0 e
i3pi
4
)
,
T † = A−ipi
4
=
(
1 0
0 e
−ipi
4
)
, (T 3)† = A−i3pi
4
=
(
1 0
0 e
−i3pi
4
)
.
By combining T-like gate with the H gate, it is possible to rotate at 8 axes
that are not parallel. Table 1 shows that 8 axes and combination of gates. In
particular, note that the rotation axis of T †HT †H is parallel to the rotation axis
of HTHT . It is known that the arbitrary 1-qubit gate can be approximated
by the combination of THTH and HTHT [12]. Those two axes rotation is not
parallel, so that those axes can make any rotation for quantum state that Alice
want to make. It is known for universal gate set for 1-qubit gate. In the same
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way as, any 1-qubit gates can be approximated by the gate group shown in the
Table 1.
Table 1: Axes of rotation and that combination of gates
Gate Axis of rotation
THTH (cos pi8 ,sin
pi
8 ,cos
pi
8 )
THT †H (− cos pi8 ,− sin pi8 ,cos pi8 )
T †HTH (cos pi8 ,− sin pi8 ,− cos pi8 )
T †HT †H (− cos pi8 ,sin pi8 ,− cos pi8 )
T 3HT 3H (cos 3pi8 ,sin
3pi
8 ,cos
3pi
8 )
T 3H(T 3)†H (− cos 3pi8 ,− sin 3pi8 ,cos 3pi8 )
(T 3)†HT 3H (cos 3pi8 ,− sin 3pi8 ,− cos 3pi8 )
(T 3)†H(T 3)†H (− cos 3pi8 ,sin 3pi8 ,− cos 3pi8 )
Bob cannot know which gate combination was chosen because he cannot
know the received state |Aθ〉. Alice can realize any 1-qubit gates without being
known to Bob. We use this characteristic for BQC protocol.
4 Main protocol
In this section, we describe two protocols: Protocol 1 is that Alice performs the
calculation without Bob knowing the input/output and the calculation process
other than position of the CNOT gate, and Protocol 2 is that Alice performs
the concealment of all the input/output and calculation process.
In the following, Bob have a Universal Quantum Computer and Alice has
the ability to prepare a computational basis |0〉 , |1〉, and a state |Aθ〉 such that
θ is θ = npi4 (n = {0, 1, . . . , 7}), to execute the X gate and the Z gate and to
perform classical calculations. (However, this protocols does not require Bob to
have the ability to execute the non-clifford gate group, so that could be eased.)
4.1 Protocol 1
By section 3, we can execute any 1-qubit gate without being known to Bob and
our first protocol use this hidden 1-qubit gate.
step1 Alice makes a calculation circuit for her calculation.
step2 Alice converts the circuit for a weak blind circuit by Table 1. That
conversion is optional, so that Alice can make some structure circuits.
Alice chooses one of them.
step3 Alice encrypts the necessary input qubits using quantum one-time pad
and sends it to Bob. In addition, Alice encrypts the ancilla bits required
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for T gate and its modification with quantum one-time pad and send it to
Bob.
step4 After sending all the qubits, Alice sends Bob the circuits for the com-
putation. Bob performs the circuits using the ancilla bits and his H and
CNOT gates. At this time, Bob sends the measurement result to Alice
and asks whether it is the desired result. If the result is not desired, Bob
make additional modifications by using additinal ancilla bits and his Z
gate.
step5 Bob sends the qubits to Alice after the calculation is completed. Alice
unencripts the send qubits, measures it, and obtains the result.
Alice can performs the calculation without Bob knowing the input/output and
the calculation process other than position of the CNOT gate. Here, we define
weak blindness.
Definition 1 (Weak blind). Let P be a quantum delegated computation on
input X and let L(X) be any function of the input. We say that a quantum
delegated computation protocol is weak blind while leaking at most L(X) and
position of the CNOT gate if, on Alice’s input X, for any fixed Y = L(X), the
following two hold when given Y :
1. The distribution of the classical information obtained by Bob in P is in-
dependent of X.
2. Given the distribution of classical information described in 1, Bob cannot
know about 1-qubit gate executed between the CNOT gate.
Theorem 2. Protocol 1 is weak blind while leaking at circuit size and the
CNOT gate position.
Proof. Bob obtains information on the circuit size and CNOT position from
Alice’s calculation procedure. Alice’s input and ancilla bits are encrypted by
quantum one-time pad, and the encryption key does not depend on the input
and ancilla bits, so Bob knows nothing about the input and ancilla bits. Bob
measures when executing a 1-qubit gate, but the measurement result has a
success probability of 1/2 regardless of the gate to execute and does not depend
on the input. Therefore, Bob does not get any information when executing the
1-qubit gate. Bob cannot learn anything about the output since the computed
state, which is the output, is still encrypted by quantum one-time pad. Protocol
1 satisfies weak blind since Bob does not know anything other than the circuit
size and CNOT position.
Bob does not know anything about the state of the qubits received that Alice
encrypts by quantum one-time pad, and the quantum operation and measure-
ment result do not depend on the contents of the input and the 1-qubit gate, so
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Figure 9: Circuit based on BFK protocol graph
Bob can knows only the size of the input and the position of the CNOT gate.
Note that Alice can resize the larger one by sending dummy ancilla bits.
Since Bob knows the position of the CNOT, there is a possibility that Bob
can infer the algorithm from the position of the CNOT when executing a known
algorithm, such as Shor and Grover. However, if a new algorithm or applica-
tion is unknown to the public, Alice can execute the computational algorithm
without Bob knowing it. Therefore, unpublished algorithms and applications
can be tested without eavesdropping on evil Bob.
Since the existing Broadbent’s protocol [6] required a one ancilla bit per the
T gate, the ability to conceal unpublished algorithms can be provided by adding
two more ancilla bits to Broadbent’s protocol. However, in plotocol 1 Alice’s
ability must be higher than that required by in Broadbent’s protocol (ability to
prepare |0〉 , |1〉 and execute the X , Z, H , and P gates).
4.2 Protocol 2
A circuit like Figure 9 referring to BFK protocol can be created. The identity
gate and the CNOT gate can be realized by combining the two CZ gates and
1-qubit gates as shown in Figure 10-11. Here, Rz(
pi
4 ) and Rx(
pi
4 ) represent the
z-axis and x-axis rotation of the Bloch sphere, respectively. Since Bob cannot
obtain information about 1-qubit gate, he cannot determine whether the identity
gate or the CNOT gate is realized by the two CZ gates. By putting two sets of
the CZ gates alternately and staggered as shown in Figure 9, Alice can perform
the calculation without letting Bob know the position of the CNOT gate.
The procedure for Protocol 2 is the same as the procedure for Protocol 1.
However, it is necessary to send extra ancilla bits for single qubits between the
CZ gates.
step1 Alice makes a calculation circuit for her calculation.
step2 Alice converts the circuit for a blind circuit by Table 1 and Figure 9-11.
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Figure 10: Combination of the CZ gates and 1-qubit gates acting as the Identity
gate
RZ(

4
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4
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
4
)
Figure 11: Combination of the CZ gates and 1-qubit gates acting as the CNOT
gate
Note that number of 1-qubit gates between two CZ gate is constant for
blindness. When those number of 1-qubit gates is less than constant, Alice
adds dummy qubits. That conversion is optional, so that Alice can make
some structure circuits. Alice chooses one of them.
step3 Alice encrypts the necessary input qubits using quantum one-time pad
and sends it to Bob. In addition, Alice encrypts the ancilla bits required
for T gate and its modification with quantum one-time pad and send it to
Bob.
step4 After sending all the qubits, Alice sends Bob the circuits for the com-
putation. Bob performs the circuits using the ancilla bits and his H and
CZ gates. At this time, Bob sends the measurement result to Alice and
asks whether it is the desired result. If the result is not desired, Bob make
additional modifications by using additinal ancilla bits and his Z gate.
step5 Bob sends the qubits to Alice after the calculation is completed. Alice
unencripts the send qubits, measures it, and obtains the result.
Alice can perform quantum computation while hiding all calculation process,
including the position of the CNOT gate. Here, we define blind.
Definition 3 (Blind [4, Definition 2]). Let P be a quantum delegated compu-
tation on input X and let L(X) be any function of the input. We say that a
quantum delegated computation protocol is blind while leaking at most L(X) if,
on Alice’s input X, for any fixed Y = L(X), the following two hold when given
Y :
1. The distribution of the classical information obtained by Bob in P is in-
dependent of X.
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2. Given the distribution of classical information described in 1, the state of
the quantum system obtained by Bob in P is fixed and independent of X.
Theorem 4. Protocol 2 is blind while leaking at circuit size.
Proof. Bob obtains information on the circuit size from Alice’s calculation pro-
cedure. Alice’s input and ancilla bits are encrypted by quantum one-time pad,
and the encryption key does not depend on the input and ancilla bits, so Bob
knows nothing about the input and ancilla bits. Bob measures when executing a
1-qubit gate, but the measurement result has a success probability of 1/2 regard-
less of the gate to execute and does not depend on the input. Therefore, Bob
does not get any information when executing 1-qubit gate. The CNOT gates
cannot be distinguished from the identity gates by combining 1-qubit gates and
the CZ gates, so Bob can execute the CNOT gate without knowing where in
the circuit the CNOT gate was executed. Bob cannot learn anything about the
output since the computed state, which is the output, is still encrypted by quan-
tum one-time pad. Protocol 2 satisfies blind since Bob does not know anything
other than the circuit size.
Bob can obtain no information about the state of the qubit received from
Alice by quantum one-time pad, and the quantum operation and measurement
result do not depend on the input and calculation processes. Therefore, Bob
can only know the size of the input, Protocol 2 satisfy blindness. However, the
size can be changed to a larger one by sending dummy ancilla bits.
In the previous research, Blindness of all calculation processes was simulta-
neously performed by Bob for each gate including {H, P, T, CZ, CNOT } to a
necessary qubit to computation and dummy qubits, then Bob sent back those
qubits to Alice, which saved the necessary qubits in quantum memory and sent
it back at the time when Bob needed to execute the necessary gates [9, 16]. In
Protocol 2, quantum memory and additional quantum communication can be
reduced from the previous research protocol, and Alice’s ability equivalent to
that required by the BFK protocol. However, it requires more ancilla bits than
protocol 1.
5 Verification and Fault tolerant
5.1 Verification
Verification are strongly related to Blindness [4]. If the problem that Alice
wants to solve is included in the computational complexity class NP, it can
be verified using a classical computer, but it is believed that BQP is BQP 6⊂
NP [19,20]. Therefore, it is difficult to verify whether the result of the problem
included in BQP is correct by a classical computer and Alice who has few
quantum resources. Thus, it is necessary to verify that the evil Bob does not
follow Alice’s instructions and performs different operations. Here, we show that
verification using trap qubits is possible in protocol 1 and protocol 2 shown in
this paper. Note that a method that does not use trap qubits, which can be
10
used for Blindness calculations, is also known [17]. And even if Alice that has
only classical computer, a method that can do verification exists [18].
The following verification method using trap qubits can be used for both
protocol 1 and protocol 2. Since the input and the 1-qubit gate are hidden in
those protocol, the trap qubit can be put in the input qubit. The trap qubit is
|0〉 or |+〉 encrypted with quantum one-time pad, and all trap qubit gates are
implemented as the identity gates that is the Aθ gates with θ = 0. However,
since the identity gate succeeds with probability 1, it must be included with a
probability of each 1/4 that the desired measurement result is not obtained once
(Alice execute the Aθ gate operates with two θ = 0 qubits that is the identity
gate) and the desired measurement result is not obtained twice (Alice execute
the Aθ gate that realizes the identity gate of θ = 0 and the Z gate of θ = pi
and let Bob correct it with the Z gate). When the evil Bob tries to operate
the gate differently from Alice’s instruction, Alice can know stochastically if he
operates on the trap qubit. In the case of calculating N qubits mixed with Nd
trap qubits, Alice can detect evil Bob’s operation with the probability of Nd
N
.
Alice can increase the probability of detection to 1 − (N−Nd
N
)s by performing
the same calculation s times.
5.2 Fault tolerant quantum computation
It is known that the ability to perform error correction in a universal quantum
computer is an indispensable function, since coherence is destroyed by external
noise in order to manipulate the quantum state [12,21–24]. It is shown that there
is no universal gate sets that is transversal (does not spread errors). [25, 26].
However, it is known that the H gates and the CNOT gates can implement
error correction codes in a transversal manner (without spreading errors) [27,
28]. For the T gate, this method is implemented only by transversal CNOT
and measurement by teleportation. In this protocol, the gates used in Bob’s
calculation are only the H gate and the CNOT gate, and a non-transversal
T-like gate can execute a logical T-like gate by preparing multiple similar Aθ
state. Therefore, It can be extended to fault tolerant calculations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a BQC protocol at circuit based quantum compu-
tation. These protocols can execute computation at weak blind and blind . In
previous research [2, 6], it was known that Alice’s input and output could be
concealed from Bob by using quantum one-time pad. However, these were not
technique for concealing the calculation process. In our protocol, Blindness was
achieved by using gate teleportation and expanding the T gate, which is impor-
tant for universal quantum computation, to the T-like gate. First, we proposed
weak blindness, which discloses the position of the CNOT gate in addition to
the size of the circuit, and a non-disclosed calculation algorithm is sufficient, and
proposed protocol 1 that satisfies it. In protocol 2, blind quantum computation
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was achieved by CBQC. Furthermore, these were shown that verification using
trap qubits is possible in these protocol. We also showed that the method can
be extended to fault-tolerant calculations in the same way as error correction
using magic state.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Takayuki Miyadera for many helpfull comments, and
are grateful to Ikko Hamamura for important advice at protocol.
References
[1] M. Abadi, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Kilian, On hiding information from an
oracle. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 39, 21-50, 1989.
[2] A. M. Childs, Secure assisted quantum computation. Quantum Information
and Computation, 5, 456-466, 2005.
[3] D. Aharonov, M. Ben-Or, and E. Eban, Interactive proofs for quantum
computations. arXiv:1704.04487v1
[4] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons and E. Kashefi, Universal Blind Quantum
Computation. In Proceedings of the 50st Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2009), 517-526, 2009.
[5] T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Blind quantum computation protocol in which
Alice only makes measurements. Physical Review A, 87, 050301,2013.
[6] A. Broadbent, Delegating Private Quantum Computations. Canadian Jour-
nal of Physics, 93, 941-946, 2015.
[7] M. Hayashi and T. Morimae, Verifiable Measurement-Only Blind Quan-
tum Computing with Stabilizer Testing. Physical Review Letters, 115,
220502,2015.
[8] X. Tan, X. Zhou, Universal half-blind quantum computation. Annals of
Telecommunications,72, 589-595, 2017.
[9] W. Liu, Z. Chen, J. Liu, Z. Su and L. Chi, Full-Blind Delegating Private
Quantum Computation. BIOCELL, 56, 211-223, 2018.
[10] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. D. Wolf, Private quantum chan-
nels. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science (FOCS 2000), 547-553, 2000.
[11] J. Fitzsimons and E. Kashefi, Unconditionally verifiable blind computation.
Physical Review A, 96, 012303, 2017.
12
[12] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum computation and quantum in-
formation. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[13] D. Gottesman, The Heisenberg representation of quantum computers. In
Group 22: Proceedings of the XXII International Colloquium on Group
Theoretical Methods in Physics, 3243, 1998.
[14] M. Hajdusˇek and C. A. Pe´rez-Delgado and J. Fitzsimons, Device-
Independent Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation. arXiv:1502.02563v2
[15] A. Gheorghiu, E Kashefi and P Wallden, Robustness and device indepen-
dence of verifiable blind quantum computing. New Journal of Physics, 17,
083040, 2015.
[16] J. F. Fitzsimons, Private quantum computation: an introduction to blind
quantum computing and related protocols. npj Quantum Inf 3, 23, 2017.
[17] T. Morimae. Blind quantum computing can always be made verifiable.
arXiv:1803.06624v1
[18] U. Mahadev. Classical Verification of Quantum Computations, In Proceed-
ings of the 59st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS 2018), 259-267, 2018.
[19] S. Aaronson, BQP and the polynomial hierarchy. Proceedings of the forty-
second ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 141-150, 2010.
[20] R. Raz and A. Tal, Oracle Separation of BQP and PH. Proceedings of the
51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 13-23,
2019.
[21] P. W. Shor, Scheme for reducing decoherence in quantum computer mem-
ory.Physical Review A, 52, R2493(R), 1995.
[22] D. P. DiVincenzo and P. W. Shor, Fault-tolerant error correction with
efficient quantum codes. Physical Review Letters, 77, 3260, 1996.
[23] J. Preskill, Fault-tolerant quantum computation.
arXiv:quant-ph/9712048v1
[24] A. Y. Kitaev. Quantum computations: algorithms and error correction.
Russian Mathematical Surveys, 52, 11911249, 1997.
[25] X. Chen, H. Chung, A. W. Cross, B. Zeng, and I. L. Chuang, Subsystem
stabilizer codes cannot have a universal set of transversal gates for even
one encoded qudit. Physical Review A, 78, 2008.
[26] B. Eastin and E. Knill, Restrictions on Transversal Encoded Quantum Gate
Sets. Physical Review Letters, 102, 110502, 2009.
13
[27] S. Bravyi and A. Kitaev, Universal quantum computation with ideal Clif-
ford gates and noisy ancillas. Physical Review A, 71, 022316, 2005.
[28] A. G. Fowler, S. J. Devitt and C. Jones, Surface code implementation of
block code state distillation. Scientific Reports, 3, 2013.
14
